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“Where does the Trinity appear?” 
Augustine’s Apologetics and “Philosophical” Readings of the De Trinitate 
 
Lewis Ayres 
 
I 
One persistent strand of commentary treats Augustine’s De trinitate as most 
significantly an apologetic intended to demonstrate Christianity’s completion of and 
superiority to the classical philosophical tradition.1  Scholars in this tradition begin by 
identifying a particular nexus of argument within ancient tradition as a fundamental 
aporia and then show how Augustine pushes beyond any earlier “solution”. In most 
cases, those who argue thus see Augustine’s success as his development of a 
“philosophical” foundation on which discussion of God and human selfhood can proceed.  
In many cases, Augustine’s status as a predecessor of some form of idealist thought is 
overtly identified as his achievement.  In my recent monograph Augustine and the Trinity 
I made no comment on this scholarly tradition – largely because I had decided to focus on 
a positive statement of what I see as Augustine’s Trinitarian vision.  In this paper I want 
to offer some comment on the tradition I had ignored, but to do so at something of a 
tangent.  At the same time this paper fills another lacuna by sketching one of the key 
themes I would use to frame a more extended account of De trinitate XI-XIII, books that 
received little comment in my monograph. 
We cannot, however, make progress without a little more clarity about the 
scholarly tradition mentioned in my initial sentences.  In order to avoid too many 
generalizations, let me describe two distinct arguments, the first that of a Cambridge 
                                                 
1  I am very grateful to Andrew Radde-Gallwitz for discussion of the ideas in this paper at 
an early stage and for the help of Mark DelCogliano and James B. Wallace.  I would also 
like to thank those who participated in the discussion at Villanova, and those who 
discussed a subsequent version of the paper at the University of Nottingham. 
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doctoral dissertation written in 1975 by Fr Edward Booth OP, and published as a series of 
articles in Augustiniana, the second Roland Kany’s 2003 Bochum habilitation.  The 
trajectory that shapes Booth’s analysis begins with a tension in Aristotle’s account of 
knowing and the intelligible objects of knowing.2  In De anima III, nous creates 
intelligible realities, and desire plays no role in knowing; in Metaphysics Λ intelligible 
realities pre-exist nous, moreover, they attract and actualize nous.3  This tension is 
exasperated by Aristotle’s assumptions about the continuity between knower and what is 
known in intellectual knowing – what is the status of the individual nous in relation to 
nous as a whole? – and by his uncertain attitude toward human self-knowing and 
consciousness – is there permanent central self-consciousness, or is the human being only 
intermittently involved in self contemplation?4  Having outlined these uncertainties, 
Booth leaps forward to Plotinus who is taken to offer a radical solution to these 
Aristotelian dilemmas.  Although the One cannot be involved in thinking, Nous is able to 
think and to comprehend the multiple because of its unitary self-presence.  Human 
knowing is an act of participation in the life of Nous and, thus, when it is realized, the 
human nous is fully absorbed. 
Booth’s Augustine writes the De trinitate against the background of the 
intellectual challenge presented by Neo-platonic pagans arriving in Carthage.  Some of 
these embraced “Arianism” – for Booth halfway between Platonism and Christianity, and 
thus Augustine writes to show the contradictions of Neo-platonism and then to 
reconstruct its insights into a new vision.5  In sum, Augustine’s solution is to take 
                                                 
2  Edward Booth, “St. Augustine’s ‘notitia sui’ related to Aristotle and the Early Neo-
Platonists,” Aug(L) 27 (1977), 70-132, 364-401; 28 (1978), 183-221; 29 (1979), 97-124; 
see also idem, “Hegels’ Conception of Self-Knowledge Seen in Conjunction with 
Augustine’s,” Aug(L) 30 (1980), 221-250. 
3 E.g. Booth, “St. Augustine’s ‘notitia sui’”, Aug(L) 27 (1977), 107, 116 & 121: “So we 
are left with divisions and unity: not out of the desire to propose a paradoxical unity in 
diversity, but because of the insolubility of the questions posed.” 
4  Booth, “St. Augustine’s ‘notitia sui’”, Aug(L) 27 (1977), 121-132. 
5  Booth, “St. Augustine’s ‘notitia sui’”, AugStud 28 (1978), 184: “it is possible to read 
every page of the De Trinitate VIII onwards as if Neo-platonist thought were in his mind 
and as if he were deliberately and critically restructuring it to make it acceptable; and in 
particular to make its reflections on the self-knowing and self-loving of nous and the One 
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elements of neoplatonic teaching concerning the One and Nous and combine them in a 
Porphyrian style triad as the basis of the human mens.6  The distinction between God and 
humanity is secured against Plotinus and a (half-conscious) return to Aristotle’s 
conception of the mind’s independence is effected, only now with a more satisfying 
conception of intellectual knowing.7 
In a parallel fashion to Booth, but with greater historical precision, Roland Kany 
argues that the second half of the De trinitate emerged from Augustine’s engagement 
with the pagan circles around such figures as Volusianus, the circles that had such a 
fundamental role in the origin of the City of God.8  Kany then isolates what he presents as 
a central question of ancient philosophy: how can one derive multiplicity from an 
absolutely unified first principle?  If the first principle thinks then it must be multiple, and 
thus complex.  If one displaces the act of thought to a second hypostasis then the original 
problem remains: how does the One generate multiplicity?9 The problem, he argues, 
remains fundamentally the same through the history of Neoplatonism.  Kany suggests 
one can even trace ways in which this problem shaped debate in fourth century 
                                                                                                                                                 
as the basic metaphysical structure of the individual human mind.” Cf. 191: “…the neo-
Platonism which he wished to combat, to make certain that the superior insight of 
Christian philosophy would make it the legitimate heir of Graeco-Roman philosophical 
tradition.” 
6 At “Hegels’ Conception of Self-Knowledge,” 243 Booth says that in Books 9 and 10 of 
trin. Augie’s triads are “triads of purely speculative thinking” following on from “triads 
of faith”.  The observation gives a further sense of how he envisages the character of a 
successful apologetic aimed at ancient philosophical tradition. 
7  E.g. Booth, “St. Augustine’s ‘notitia sui’”, AugStud 28 (1978), 220 “Augustine’s 
conception of self-knowing in the De Trinitate is in fact a resolution of the Aristotelian 
problematic whose transcendent side had come down to him in the completely rigorous 
and all-inclusive form of neo-platonism.” (cf. similar statements of Augustine’s 
accomplishment on pp. 213-4). Perhaps because he assumes that the aporia he describes 
in Aristotle looms so large in ancient thought, Booth also tends to assume that parallels in 
doctrine indicate dependence.  E.g. at “St. Augustine’s ‘notitia sui’”, AugStud 28 (1978), 
197, Booth thinks that Augustine is familiar with debate over Metaphysics L and De 
Anima 3 on basis of parallel doctrinal elements found in Augustine. 
8  Roland Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken. Bilanz, Kritik und Weiterführung der 
modernen Forschung zu “De trinitate” (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 420 and 4. 
9  Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken, 446-456. 
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Trinitarian disputes.  While Nicene theologies coordinate language about the essence 
subsisting in three hypostases, the philosophical foundations of their position remain 
unclear; they rely unsatisfyingly on the statement of a necessary paradox, but offer no 
foundations for exploring that paradox further.10  Indeed, Kany even reads the first half of 
Augustine’s De trinitate as a “crisis of the doctrine of the Trinity”, Augustine’s analysis 
of his predecessors showing up their failure to ground rational exploration of Trinitarian 
dogma.11 
Kany argues that in the second half of his work Augustine pushes beyond the 
crisis by taking as his foundation the principle that the Trinity is not an object. In 
dialogue with Ennead V.3 Augustine develops an account of a necessary se nosse that 
defines the human mens and is, in some sense true of the divine.  This self-knowing is 
both an undifferentiated unity and can only be represented as threeness.12  Kany knows 
well that Augustine does not think he has arrived at a formal analogy, but he suggests 
Augustine has laid out a rational structure that can enable progress toward the mystery of 
God.13  In that sense ancient philosophy is consummated in a “radiant failure”. 
 The arguments of Booth and Kany certainly differ, yet both are concerned to see 
analysis of the individual self as partially founding a rational discourse about the divine, 
and both see this achievement as constituting Augustine’s apology for Christianity 
against ancient philosophical traditions.14  There are many ways in which one might 
engage this scholarly approach.  One could examine the particular construals of 
philosophical history that these scholars offer, or ask about the plausibility of their 
accounts of the Augustinian “solution”. My own approach today will take a far more 
oblique path.  In what follows I will agree that Augustine’s concern is, in part, to offer an 
                                                 
10  Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken, 466-7. 
11  Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken, 506. 
12  Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken, 518. 
13  Kany, Augustins Trinitätsdenken, 534. 
14  Both also are engaged in a dialogue with German idealism and its critics, though 
Booth’s sense of a continuity between Augustine and the Hegelian tradition is far 
stronger (and may perhaps be seen as bearing a family resemblance to the work of such 
scholars as Wayne Hankey and Werner Beierwalters). 
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apologetic, but I want to offer a rather different account of that apology’s form. I want to 
suggest that Augustine’s central concern is not so much to offer a philosophically robust 
account of human and possibly divine thought, as it is to argue for the philosophical 
necessity of a community and communal discourse that rests always on a language held 
in faith, and on belief in transformation through divine grace. 
 
II 
 Before, however, proceeding directly to Augustine himself, I want to spend a little 
while sketching a few key themes found in a new treatment by John Cavadini of 
Augustine’s apologetic strategy published in January 2013 in Modern Theology.15  John’s 
paper identifies a parallel trajectory in the De trinitate and in De civitate Dei 8-12, and 
suggests that the use of this trajectory in the overtly apologetic De civitate Dei enables us 
to understand a little more about the apologetic aspect of the De trinitate.   Allow me to 
summarize just a few aspects of John’s complex argument as a foundation for my own 
exploration. 
For Augustine, in De civitate Dei 10, the Platonists are fundamentally 
inconsistent: they say the divine is ultimately one, and yet endorse an economy of 
polytheistic worship. Augustine offers his theology as more persuasive, as accepting with 
full seriousness the unity of the divine, and as meditating on the relationship of Creator to 
creation that surely follows.  Christ acts as the unique mediator because of his unity with 
the Father (and thus Trinitarian theology is necessary in order to articulate Christ’s 
mediatorship) and brings to us the possibility of true worship.  But this worship is at its 
heart an act of sacrifice; the sacrifice of the contrite heart before God; the sacrifice of the 
works of mercy in community; and in all cases a participation in Christ’s own self-giving 
to the Father.  Faith’s importance is thus that it enables us to participate in Christ’s own 
sacrifice. 
                                                 
15  John Cavadini, “Trinity and Apologetics in the Theology of St Augustine,” Modern 
Theology 29 (2013), 48-82. 
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In De civitate Dei 11 the end of the creation is found in true and everlasting 
worship of God, a worship in which creation becomes “God’s rest”.  Platonist uncertainty 
about the body creates a system of worship in which we seek to escape embodiment, and 
hints at a divided view of the created order – with lesser realities responsible for the 
physical creation.  Thus only Christian faith can deliver an account of the unified creation 
in a relationship of true freedom under the one God. 
… the doctrine of the Trinity properly articulated makes possible a complete doctrine 
of creation.  This includes a doctrine of the human creature that emphasizes freedom 
in mercy and compassion, and a necessary course of growth and renewal in mercy 
and compassion that is our growth in freedom.  This occurs in true worship, which 
binds us into the communion of the one Body. The Eucharistic sacrifice is, in fact, 
ordered toward communion with other human beings, such that growth in freedom is 
growth in communion and growth in communion is growth in freedom.16 
The same basic argument, John argues, is to be found in the De trinitate, if in highly 
compressed form.17  But rather than explore in detail each of the ways in which John 
connects the two works, I want to focus on John’s description of how the trajectory he 
identifies helps us interpret Augustine’s interrogations of the imago in the second half of 
the De trinitate.  John suggests that the purpose of the exploration of Trinitarian 
structures that we find there is, first, to show the reader “something they can’t deny”, the 
mind remembering, understanding and loving, and thus possessing a mark that reveals us 
to be an enigma to ourselves without faith and without true worship.  The “inner vision” 
that we are offered is the result of an application of a language drawn from faith and thus, 
if the accuracy of its application be granted, an apology for that language (an apology 
aimed at both non-Christian and Christian): 
                                                 
16 Cavadini, “Trinity and Apologetics,” 73-4. At this point the reader who has not 
followed Cavadini’s recent work on Augustine should also consult his “Eucharistic 
Exegesis in Augustine’s Confessions,” AugStud 41 (2010), 87-108. 
17  Cavadini, “Trinity and Apologetics,” 70: “one moves from a consideration of the 
economy of salvation, as a series of theophanies and signs pointing to the coming of the 
Mediator, with concomitant clarification of Trinitarian doctrine, and then to the 
establishment of true worship in the sacrifice of the true Mediator. The discussion moves 
on to a more technical articulation of the Trinity in itself.” 
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interior vision, at that point, becomes the awareness of oneself as worshipping God, 
that is, awareness of oneself as sacramentally bound in a societas defined by no other 
qualification, cultural status or accomplishment which might serve the glory of 
imperium, but rather by Christ’s sacrifice alone.  It is awareness of oneself as a kind 
of question continually being posed, and continually being answered in the 
immolation of self that is one’s sacramentally conferred identity as incorporated into 
the one sacrifice of Christ.18 
Within the framework provided by John’s argument, I want now to make some 
suggestions of my own about the apologetic argument found in De trinitate Books XI-
XIII.19 
 
III 
 At a number of points in the De trinitate Augustine makes clear that he saw the 
work as partly apologetic.20 But where, then, do we find the greatest focus of apologetic 
argument in the second half of the work?  Throughout the whole second half of the work 
we find many comments on two non-Christian groups, Platonists (mostly of a theurgical 
                                                 
18  Cavadini, “Trinity and Apologetics,” 76.  Cavadini’s emphasis on this “sacramentally 
conferred identity” as an identity found by loving membership within the Church 
community is seen particularly clearly in his reservation (pp. 81-2) concerning Rowan 
William’s description of the imago as being most properly “the mind of the saint - the 
awareness of someone reflectively living out the life of justice and charity”  (“The 
Paradoxes of Self-Knowledge in the De trinitate,” in Joseph T. Lienhard, S.J. et al. (eds), 
Collectanea Augustini- ana: Augustine, Presbyter Factus Sum (New York, NY: Peter 
Lang, 1993), pp. 121–134, at p. 131): “This description may perhaps …slip almost 
imperceptibly into underwriting a split between the awareness of an inner process of 
transformation and renewal in faith, and an exterior economy of membership in the 
Church.  One looks for a “reflective” awareness of love and renewal that is somehow 
additional to and deeper than one’s simple awareness of oneself as a member of the 
visible societas of the Church.” 
19  One minor difference between our arguments is the weight I place on an anti-sceptical 
concern in trin. I think, however, that a fuller treatment of the development of 
Augustine’s apologetic for communal faith would show up the deep interrelations 
between his approach to theurgical Platonism and Skepticism. 
20 For brief discussion of these places see Cavadini, “Trinity and Apologetics,” 80, n. 97. 
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disposition) and the skeptical philosophers of the New Academy (at least as they are 
described by Cicero).  His dialogue with theurgical Platonism is particularly clear in the 
latter half of Book XIII, as it had been throughout Book IV, but most time is spent, I 
suggest with the second group, and that dialogue takes center-stage between from Book 
XI through the first half of Book XIII.   
 Book VIII is the exordium of an argument that runs initially through to the end of 
Book X.21  This argument, as you all know, culminates with the discussion of memoria, 
intellegentia and voluntas at the end of Book X.  In the last paragraph of that book 
Augustine takes a breath and postpones discussing directly the “highest and supreme 
essence” (summa et altissima essentia) of which the mind is only an image.  First, he 
announces we should explore the complex structures uncovered in Book X with reference 
to contexts marked by time, contexts that are easier for those who are a little slower to 
understand (tardoribus).22  And thus Book XI begins again with triadic structures in 
vision, and we move through the long discussion of the inner and the outer person that 
takes us toward the second extensive discussion of the imago in Book XIV.   But, as 
usual, what seem to be Augustine’s direct expressed statements of purpose can distract us 
if we do not attend to the discussions that are interwoven as the argument itself unfolds.  
To understand the apologetic arguments that are so central here, I want to turn, first, to 
Book XIII, and then look back over Books XI and XII to see how they develop aspects of 
the argument that flowers must fully in Book XIII.   
In Book XIII Augustine sends much time defending the intelligibility of human 
nature and arguing for the necessity of a communal life of faith if we are to attain those 
ends we can all be known to seek.  While Augustine insists that I cannot doubt my own 
existence, his central anti-skeptic argument actually revolves around a Platonized stoic 
vision in which the unity of humanity is such that although we cannot know what another 
                                                 
21  See my Augustine and the Trinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
281ff. 
22  Trin. 10.12.19. 
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wills, we can know in certain cases what all will.23  We are able to conjecture reliably 
toward this knowledge by some sort of fellow feeling intrinsic to human nature (de se 
quisque conjiciat, compatiente vel conspirante) – we do not do this merely by logical 
deduction, despite Augustine’s insistence that none of us know another’s soul; we do this 
by awareness within ourselves of what it is to be human.24  And thus, despite our very 
different senses of what constitutes blessedness, we can know that all, in Cicero’s words, 
desire to be blessed.25  This emphasis on common human nature will gradually reveal 
itself to be one of the key threads drawing together Augustine’s apologetic through these 
books. 
As a complement to the argument that our common nature enables conjecture 
about the desires of all, Augustine argues that the differences in the ends people pursue 
result not from many being ignorant of our true end – for nobody can will what is entirely 
unknown.  It is more plausible, Augustine suggests, that, in our current state of pravitas, 
we prefer to have all that we will, rather than to will all things well.26  Augustine thus 
offers a two-pronged argument.  An anti-skeptical account of a knowledge stemming 
from our shared nature is paired with a diagnosis of an equally common pravitas as that 
which accounts for the seemingly most obvious reason to reject the idea of any common 
knowledge.  As we shall see shortly, the second of these arguments has been extensively 
intimated in Books XI-XII. 
 Out of his opposition to solipsism and skepticism Augustine now shapes an 
argument for communal faith.  He argues that it is because the delusions and afflictions of 
this life divert us from attending to a goal we necessarily know, that faith in God is 
necessary.  Interestingly, Augustine does not speak of faith in God as delivering, in 
discrete fashion, simply beliefs about God. He assumes rather that faith delivers to us the 
                                                 
23  Trin. 13.3.6 (CCSL 50A. 387) : Est quaedam sane eiusdem naturae uiuentis et ratione 
utentis tanta conspiratio ut cum lateat alterum quid alter uelit, nonnullae sint tamen 
uoluntatem omnium etiam singulis notae, et cum quisque homo nesciat quid homo alius 
unus uelit, in quibusdam rebus possit scire quid omnes uelint. 
24  Trin. 13.3.6 (CCSL 50A. 388). 
25  Trin. 13.4.7. 
26  Trin. 13.6.9. 
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belief that all things by which one moves toward blessedness must come from God.27  A 
true conception of faith thus addresses the problem of our uncertainty in knowledge, but 
not by providing a knowledge otherwise entirely unknown, but by clarifying what we 
actually do know, by leading us to better awareness of ourselves as travelling in a 
company and context ordered by divine grace. 
Note, further, that this statement about the nature of faith is surrounded by other 
assertions that progress in faith occurs through the possession of a growing good will in 
this life, among those who also, through grace, seek progress.  Thus, the statement is 
followed by an assertion of the importance of developing a good will in the contexts of 
mutual human interaction: 
…the man who rightly desires whatever he desires is near to being happy, and when 
he gets them he will be happy… He already has one of these good things, one not at 
all to be underrated, namely a good will – if he does not desire to enjoy any of the 
good things human nature has a capacity for by committing or acquiring anything 
bad; and if he pursues such good things as are possible in this unhappy life with a 
prudent, temperate, brave, and just mind, and takes possession of them as they are 
given…28 
As this passage precedes Augustine’s précis of faith’s content, immediately following it 
we are told that the philosopher who constructs a private vision, and has sought to will 
only what he or she can, offers only a counsel against further misery and an expression of 
human pride.  It is those who endure in patience and with a good will through the evils of 
                                                 
27  Trin. 13.7.10. 
28 Trin. 13.6.9.  For the manner in which Augustine reinterprets the political virtues listed 
here (possibly following Neo-platonic precedent) see Robert Dodaro “Political and 
Theological Virtues in Augustine, De Trinitate”, Medioevo. Rivista I storia della filosofia 
medieval 31 (2006), 29-48 and idem, “Political and Theological Virtues in Augustine, 
Letter 155 to Macedonius,” Augustiniana 54 (2004), 431-474. The translations of trin. in 
this paper are usually adapted from those of Edmund Hill, WSA I/5 and Stephen 
McKenna, FoC 45, without noting each emendation.  I have also made use of the 
excellent new Italian translation (with extensive notes), Giovanni Catapano and Beatrice 
Cillerai, Agostino. La Trinita (Milan: Bompiani, 2012). 
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this world and toward the true end who are actually blessed already in hope.29  Once 
again Augustine complements an anti-skeptical and anti-solipsistical insistence that we 
do know common human ends with an account of faith’s function within a communal life 
constituted by pursuance of goods that may appropriately be attained before the eschaton. 
 
III 
 So far I have traced only the argument of Book XIII’s first half.  Allow me now to 
suggest ways in which this argument culminates Augustine’s discussion of the 
relationship between the inner and the outer person in Books XI and XII.  Augustine 
begins Book XI not so much by looking for illustrations of the Trinitarian life in that 
which pertains simply to the outer person in the abstract, as in that which pertains to the 
“decaying” outer man of 2Cor 4.16.  Augustine tells us that we may find the investigation 
of Book XI helpful both because, as created, we think more easily in material terms, and 
because of a weakness that affects our minds, now so attached to the corporeal.30  Then, 
discussing trinities of cognition that are supposedly “external”, Augustine reveals to his 
readers the unavoidable presence of the inner person, her dispositions and failing 
nature.31 And thus, to understand the character of those external trinities Augustine 
meditates upon the links in the inner person between will and image.  We may speak of a 
person possessing a multitude of wills, or acts of will, connected together as a chain: 
But all the wills that are bound to each other are good if the end to which all are 
referred is good; but if it is bad, then all are bad.  And, therefore, the series of good 
wills that are joined together is a kind of road on which there are, as it were, certain 
steps for those ascending to happiness… Blessed are they who by their deeds and 
                                                 
29  Trin. 13.7.10. 
30  Trin. 11.1.1.  Cf. 11.5.8: a third time Augustine presents the problem of thinking 
toward God as resulting from our participation in the decaying of the outer person, slowly 
“conformed to this world” (Rom 12.2).  Cf. also retr. 2.15, where Augustine comments 
on 11.5.9 to emphasize the possibility of an appropriate love of that which is seen in the 
creation. 
31  Trin. 11.3.6; cf 11.4.7. 
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conduct sing the song of the steps… But if something so pleases us that the will rests 
and finds some delight in it, yet this is not yet the end for which it is striving; but this 
too, is referred to something further, so that it may be regarded not as the rest of the 
citizen in his native land, but as it were the refreshment, or even the lodging of the 
traveler.32 
The communal structures that support the faithful will being nurtured toward health are 
only hinted at here, although recognizing whom Augustine indicates in his references to 
those singing the song of the steps is not difficult! That which we saw in Book XIII is 
here only in nuce, but it is here in Augustine’s insistence on the importance of travelling 
together the road that forms our wills.  Only thus can a refreshment come that will enable 
the gradual purification of the mind unable to recognize the character of the imago Dei 
that we are. 
The theme unfolds a little further in Book XII.  Augustine’s extended attempt in 
that book to read as an allegory the relationship between male and female in 1 Cor 11.7 
and 1Tim 2.13-15 ends with an account of the inner person being renewed through the 
gradual re-ordering of the will in the context of communal life.  It is the works of mercy 
that take center-stage in this renewal, because such acts are performed by those who have 
faith and are ordered by love toward the worship of God.   Such acts gradually equip the 
inner person to govern the outer and reverse the obsession with lower goods and images 
that has led to our decay.33  In a move which shows the hints given in Book XI gradually 
being filled out toward the fuller account of Book XIII, Augustine emphasizes that the 
obsession with individual possession that marks fallen humanity paradoxically stems 
from a desire for more than “the whole” (plus aliquid universo appetens).34  Adumbrating 
a theme central to the first half of Book XIII Augustine speaks of each of us possessing 
our bodies as a part of  “the whole”, and of laws that govern that “whole”.  The “whole” 
of which he speaks, of which we must learn to be part, whose law we must learn to 
embrace, is the created order; a little later Augustine insists that the soul’s true destiny 
                                                 
32  Trin. 11.6.10. 
33  Trin. 12.8.13. 
34  Trin. 12. 9.14 (CCSL 50A. 368): plus aliquid universo appetens.  
 13 
consists in following God as its ruler “throughout the whole creation” (in uniuersitate 
creaturae).35  The desire for self-determination and control over one’s environment is 
thus now relocated as irrational, and the common life of those singing the song of the 
steps is the context within which we may begin to practice again the communal acting 
and loving that is gifted us as human beings.  As Augustine writes a few sentences later: 
When, therefore, the soul gives thought either to itself or to others with a good will 
which aims at grasping interior and higher things, things that are not possessed 
privately, but in common by all who love them, things that are possessed neither in a 
limited sense nor enviously, but in a free embrace, then, even if it is mistaken in 
something through ignorance of temporal matters (for here too the soul must act in 
time!) and does not hold to the mode of acting that it ought, this is only a “human 
temptation” (1Cor 10.13).  It is a great thing in this life, which we travel as if returning 
on a road, to spend one’s time such that no temptation takes hold of us other than the 
human.36 
Here, looking to “higher things” – a concept rather easily taken as a marker of 
Augustinian solipsism – is linked to looking at that which is common, and at that which 
consequently must be “grasped” or “understood” only in a “free embrace”. Castus, which 
I have translated as “free”, might be thought to mean only “chaste”, but in English this 
would fail to grasp the import of the opposition between possessing something with 
narrowness (angustia vel invidia) and castus, which follows Augustine’s emphasis on the 
common possession of that which is higher. This desire is certainly “chaste”, in the sense 
                                                 
35  Trin. 12.9.14 (CCSL 50. 368).  Such obedience is, not surprisingly, expressed as a 
possibility not taken up: cum in uniuersitate creaturae deum rectorem secuta legibus eius 
optime gubernari potuisset… This aspect of Augustine’s apologetic has its roots in his 
early polemic against Manichaeism and Skepticism.  There, arguing for an ordered 
intelligible universe as the context within which any given part fits is central, see e.g. c. 
Faust. 21.5. 
36  Trin. 12. 10.15 (CCSL 50A. 369): Cum ergo bona uoluntate ad interiora ac superiora 
percipienda quae non priuatim sed communiter ab omnibus qui talia diligunt sine ulla 
angustia uel inuidia casto possidentur amplexu uel sibi uel aliis consulit, etsi fallatur in 
aliquo per ignorantiam temporalium quia et hoc temporaliter gerit et modum agendi non 
teneat quem debebat, humana temptatio est. Et magnum est hanc uitam sic degere quam 
uelut uiam redeuntes carpimus ut temptatio nos non apprehendat nisi humana. 
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that it does not grasp, seeking to possess as its own, but it is also free in its desire to think 
of the whole, to be part of that which is beyond itself. 
We have now, then, considered ways in which Books XI and XII lead up to the 
first half of Book XIII. Together these three sections offer an extended apology for a 
communal life built on a common faith and in which the good will is nurtured. Had we 
space, we could now turn to the second half of Book XIII, in which Augustine offers a 
defense of the manner in which the Son became incarnate to persuade us of the need for 
grace, and of the reality of its presence uniting us in him, is intended to complete the 
apologetic for the life of faith that Augustine has offered.  But the literature on that 
famous discussion is vast, and need not distract us in this preliminary investigation.37 
 
IV 
If I am right about the direction of Augustine’s apologetic in Books XI-XIV, how 
does it help us to engage the sort of arguments that Booth and Kany offer?  Well, the first 
step is to consider how the apology of Books XI-XIII relates to the argument of Books IX 
and X.  At one level there is a deep continuity: Augustine’s account of the triads he 
describes in Books IX and X is persistently concerned not so much with the boundary 
between the “inner” and the “outer” triads, but in the continuum between them.  The 
triads of “outer” vision and cognition necessarily involve the inner person, and draw us 
toward an investigation of that inner life.  Indeed, the more we understand the 
interrelationship between memory and desire, the more clearly we understand the 
necessity of a rightly ordered relationship between inner and outer.  There is then a deep 
continuity when, in Books XI-XIII, Augustine gradual draws out an apology for that 
communal life in faith and worship that alone can shape us toward right contemplation. 
                                                 
37  The appropriate literature here is vast.  For some pointers here see Cavadini, “Trinity 
and Apologetics”; Lewis Ayres “Christology and Faith in Augustine's De trinitate XIII: 
Toward Relocating Books VIII - XV,” AugStud 29 (1998), 111-139 (although what I 
offer in this paper corrects that earlier discussion in a number of ways).  As well as 
drawing out this Christological (and Trinitarian) completion of his argument, a fuller 
treatment would also need to offer an extended discussion of the gradual development of 
the apologetic arguments I have isolated here. 
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And yet, at another level, there is a rather obvious discontinuity.  In Books XI-
XIII Augustine does not offer an apology for the conceptual language in which he 
describes the mind in Books IX-X – other than that which is simply the language of the 
faith itself!  Certainly, in Books IX-X themselves Augustine argues for the coherence of 
the conceptual structures he deploys – and this should probably be read as in some sense 
apologetic.  But when he directly identifies his task as taking on adherents of non-
Christian philosophical traditions, he does not return again to these structures, but he 
argues for his mode of inquiry and for the community of faith that is its home.  
How, then, does offering this apology help Augustine to strengthen the 
plausibility of Books IX-X?  My first answer is that arguing for the global necessity of a 
communal life in faith provides more context for, and renders more plausible, the 
particular modes of thinking in faith that is performed in Books IX-X.  And if we are to 
see this connection we must turn for a moment to those modes.  In my own most recent 
treatment of Books IX and X, I made central the principle that Augustine analyzes the 
mind in the light of Trinitarian faith as well as in order to illustrate Trinitarian faith.  In 
the exordium that is Book VIII, Augustine draws us toward confessing that we know and 
experience love itself, only in order to demand that this love must be Trinitarian if love is 
God.  We cannot yet see with any clarity how it is so, but faith and reasoned interrogation 
in its light insists that it must be so.  Then, in Books IX and X, Augustine uses the 
language of Nicene faith to interrogate the imago in us on the grounds that the imago 
necessarily illustrates God’s Triunity.  The whole exercitatio strains our minds toward 
Book XV, where once again and as we shall see in a moment, Augustine repeats the 
exercise of Book VIII, asking again if we can see the Trinitarian structure that we know 
in faith to be true of God.  The language of faith is not here transcended because, despite 
the advances made between Books VIII and XV, we must answer the question similarly: 
still we cannot sustain our sight of what we know to be true. 
But, and second, if we can see that the communal life of faith is the necessary 
context for that reformation necessary for appropriate worship and hence knowledge of 
God, then we may be a little more clearly how the language of faith may aid our 
interrogation of the intelligible and ordered creation.  At the same time, throughout 
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Books IX-X, Augustine insists that we cannot understand how we may move toward a 
deeper understanding and worship of the divine without being ever more attentive to the 
need for a reformation of the process by which that which he likens to an “inner word” is 
formed.  Now, in Books XI-XIII he has suggested with far greater clarity how the 
communal life of faith aids the process of such a reformation.  
However, and third, Augustine is not only offering an apology for something that 
he has already said. He is also setting the context within which he will be able to state 
with new poignancy the importance of us embracing our failure to achieve any full 
understanding in this life.  Once one is persuaded of the need to accept the task of living 
in charity and in faith in the concrete community of Christ’s body if the mind’s gaze is to 
be purified, then the importance of confessing ignorance, even when exercising 
distinctive intellectual gifts becomes clearer. 
And thus it should not surprise us that the character of our knowing and not 
knowing in faith takes center-stage in Book XV, the book where Augustine finally 
returns to the task of talking directly about the Trinity in whose image we are made, a 
task postponed at the end of Book X, but now taken up after his extended apology for the 
communal life of faith.  In Book VIII, as I noted earlier, Augustine calls us to look as 
directly as we may at love, to recognize that true love simply is God, and hence is of 
necessity Trinitarian, but that we fail to see how it is so. Like catching sight of the sun, 
the divine light is too much for us and we cannot sustain our gaze long enough to see it 
for what it is.  Now, in Book XV, Augustine begins the first main section of his argument 
by slowly playing out for us exactly the same question.  He offers a brief account of the 
divine nature, asserts that each of the characteristics he names is true of each of the divine 
three.  He asks “where and how will the Trinity appear?”38  Again Augustine lists divine 
attributes.  Gradually they are reduced them to three – eternity, wisdom and blessedness.  
Interestingly, the intellectual labor he performs here is not that of a sluggish mind baffled 
by Augustine’s, but of a mind following and perhaps all too invested in the progress of 
the argument.  But, in this reduction, have we arrived at the Trinity?  No, because even 
here the three may be reduced to one.  All such attributes are identical in God, and thus 
                                                 
38  Trin. 15.5.7 (CCSL 50A. 468): ubi aut quomodo Trinitas apparebit? 
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the Trinity seems again to have disappeared.  Posing a rhetorical question, Augustine 
exclaims 
what modes of arguing, then, force or strength of understanding, what liveliness of 
reasoning, gaze of thought will show… that this one Wisdom called God is a 
Trinity?39 
In Book VIII, Augustine comments, the Trinity never actually appeared (nulla trinitas 
apparebat) - even toward the end of the book when love itself was discussed, “the Trinity 
dawned only a little” (eluxit palulum trinitas).  But after the progression of Books IX-X, 
and the reprise of Books XI-XIIV, what now can we see, he asks again, “where does the 
Trinity appear?”40 
 Subtly insinuating the answer that the astute reader might have sensed by the end 
of Book X, Augustine answers his question only obliquely, by discussing Paul’s image of 
us seeing through a mirror and in an enigma.  Gradually, however, two elements of an 
answer emerge.  The first is quite simply that the Trinity “appears” only in moments 
when the mind suddenly recognizes or judges accurately something in its search to see 
how the language of faith might correspond to the reality of God’s simplicity.  But these 
moments of recognition and judgment are effective and purifying if they are located 
within a communal life reaching out to God and yet also embracing the inevitable 
recognition of divine transcendence, within a life formed by the practice and life of our 
common worship, into the life that is an adoption into Christ’s own sacrificial prayer. 
Allow me to fill out a little more the structure of the intellectual movement 
Augustine thinks himself to have performed by all the circling around the question 
initially posed in Book VIII that has occupied Books IX-XIV.  Let us turn for a few 
moments to part of his consideration of the Wisdom or Word beginning at 15.11.20.  This 
discussion is one of three, concerning Father, Son and Spirit that are offered in turn, each 
of which, on the surface, seeks to summarize what may be learnt from the analogical 
                                                 
39  Trin. 15.6.9 (CCSL 50A. 471): Quis itaque disputandi modus, quaenam tandem uis 
intellegendi atque potentia, quae uiuacitas rationis, quae acies cogitationis ostendet, ut 
alia iam taceam, hoc unum quod sapientia dicitur deus quomodo sit trinitas?. 
40  Trin. 15.6.10.  
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work that has been undertaken.  In the section to which I am turning, Augustine repeats 
his exhortation that if we seek to understand the Word of God we must look to our own 
“inner word”. But what we seek is carefully phrased: we seek to arrive at the word 
“through its likeness, of whatever sort it may be, in an enigma, the Word of God may in 
some manner be seen.”41  Augustine’s qualifications draw our attention to the 
uncertainties of any seemingly positive summary of what has been learnt through the 
exercising of the mind that has taken place since Book VIII.  In the paragraphs that 
follow Augustine performs an intellectual movement through different ways in which 
Scripture speaks of the uniqueness of God’s Word, and suggests how we may gradually 
recognize connections between these different statements of the divine reality.  We are 
drawn then to the inner word and meditate on the utter truth and certainty of that which 
the Father speaks in his Word.  Augustine highlights for us likenesses (similitudines) 
between the “inner word” and the divine, but in each case Augustine emphasizes ways in 
which the similarity enables our understanding a little more deeply the progress that we 
must make toward the perfection of the image. 
At the culmination of these sentences, Augustine celebrates that the perfected 
“image” will then no longer be the mirror through which we gain our only sight, but will 
simply see “face to face”.42  And then immediately, “in this enigma, in this likeness of 
whatever sort it may be, who can explain how great its unlikeness is?”43  A brief anti-
skeptical rehearsal of our own knowing follows as a preliminary (we are referred openly 
to the Contra Academicos for more detail) to a series of interrogations in which 
Augustine explores how what we see in the human “word” fails to describe that which 
seems to be logically necessary for the Triune God.44  In both the positive and negative 
moments of the movement Augustine performs for us, understanding comes as we 
gradually learn to make distinctions, to highlight similarity and difference.  
                                                 
41  Trin. 15.11.20 (CCSL 50A. 487): per cuius qualemcumque similitudinem sicut in 
aenigmate uideatur utcumque dei uerbum… 
42 Trin. 15.11.21. 
43  Trin. 15.11.21 (CCSL 50A. 490). 
44 Trin. 15.12.21-13.22. 
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But the end of the intellect’s movement is actually narrated before Augustine 
offers this summary. The passage I have summarized is preceded by an exhortation 
toward the task of thinking in faith, and Augustine tells us that as we recognize our 
inability to grasp the Wisdom by which God knows all as present, we should come to a 
point at which we cry out, in the words of Psalm 138.6, mirificata est scientia tua ex me, 
“your knowledge has been exalted above me”, knowing now that I understand (intelligo) 
something of the divine incomprehensibility, because I cannot understand myself (me 
ipsum).  But, in the exercitatio of reaching this point a fire burns out which sustains the 
search.45  Desire for God flames out, note, not because one somehow rises toward a 
seeing of the divine, but in that movement which draws us into moments of positive 
recognition, and toward moments in which we recognize our inability to understand, and 
thus back to the life and language of the faith delivered us. In this manner, understanding 
is tied to recognition of mystery, to the need for grace, and to the need for us to embrace 
life within the communal matrix of faith. 
The very same Psalm text, 138.6, reappears toward the end of Augustine’s 
summary discussion of the Spirit.46  Augustine uses the verse to commence the final 
section of that discussion.  In the middle of a conclusion in which he calls those who 
cannot grasp his explanations to believe in the Scriptures and seek to understand by 
praying, studying and living well (orando et quaerendo et bene vivendo47), and in which 
he again celebrates the human mens as a site for intellectual exercise (in the light of 
faith’s language), Ps 138.6 further qualifies even the careful qualifications of this latter 
celebration, and is followed by a change of person and register as Augustine now 
addresses his soul directly before the prayer that ends the De trinitate as a whole.  The 
message of this address to his soul is one we should by now expect; at beginning and end 
Augustine questions: “where do you stand until all your diseases have been healed by 
him who is merciful to all your faults?... who, therefore, heals all your diseases, except he 
                                                 
45  Trin. 15.7.13. 
46  Trin. 15.27.50. 
47  Trin. 15.27.49 (CCSL 50A. 531). 
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who is merciful to all your sins?”48  Between these questions Augustine recognizes that 
the soul has certainly seen “many true things” (multa vera) – and he speaks both of the 
soul making intellectual distinctions in that light which renders such discrimination 
possible, and of that light as actively “showing” the soul these things – but the soul is 
simply unable, because of sin, to fix its gaze on that which is “seen”. And hence we are 
thrown back onto the one doctor who can heal our sickness and on to the prayer for aid 
that ends the work.  In other words, once again, Augustine rehearses the culminating 
argument of Book VIII, not to subvert that argument but to hammer it home with ever 
increasing depth.  Thus, when Augustine writes of, and when he performs in his own 
voice, a Christian ascent toward understanding within which the one thinking does not 
only embrace, but also seeks out the experience of being thwarted by the divine mystery 
– the line of sight along any seemingly clear path toward sight constantly being broken 
by that mystery – he is showing how the Christian thinker must be constantly drawn into 
confession and into thankfulness for the way of faith, and thus for the faithful community 
singing the song of the steps who know that all progress rests on grace, on their being 
drawn slowly and appropriately toward the perfection of the will.49 
  
VI 
By this point in the paper a reader could easily be forgiven for assuming that, 
while I began with the arguments of Booth and Kany, I have actually written a paper 
about something quite different.  But I do think that this “something quite different” 
enables us to get some unexpected purchase on their arguments. Allow me to conclude 
with three observations.   
First, and perhaps rather obviously, I have no objection to saying that Augustine 
makes use of themes and doctrines from Platonic or other ancient non-Christian traditions 
                                                 
48  Trin. 15.27.50 (CCSL 50A. 532-3). 
49 There is more here to be filled out, but I intend this much as a nuancing or deepening 
of my account of Augustine’s “Christological epistemology”, as offered in Augustine and 
the Trinity, chp. 6. 
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in his texts.  I do not even have any great objection in principle to arguing that in a 
particular text Augustine suggests a novel solution to a persistent problem discussed by 
an ancient tradition.  Such an argument could certainly be made without the need to show 
that such was Augustine’s intention (and thus I do certainly think that offering this sort of 
argument requires very careful discussion of intent).  One might well want to argue that 
the particular ways in which Booth or Kany (or another parallel commentator) construes 
the shape of an ancient tradition is unpersuasive, but the idea that one might think of 
Augustine contributing to such a tradition is not per se problematic.   
 Second, even though I do not think there is anything per se problematic about 
talking of Augustine in this way, in actual fact the scholarship which does so seems 
always to have found seductive a move that I think we should resist - playing down the 
extent to which Augustine sees his apologetic as a call toward the accepting the centrality 
of a faith held in common and of humility in thought. The more one abstracts Augustine’s 
“philosophical” contribution from its theological matrix in order to compare it 
(favorably) with others that have come before, the more one forgets the demands of that 
matrix.  Augustine is not simply claiming that the philosopher needs a supplementary 
knowledge for it to achieve more satisfactory results, he is suggesting that the very 
enterprise of philosophical thinking can only proceed coherently if the very structures of 
speculation are re-conceived as a movement of the soul into faith and into the reformation 
that grace shapes in the community of the faithful.  It is this radical re-conception of the 
nature of thinking, of belief and interrogation that I suspect is often hidden from us by the 
scholarly approaches that are my foil this morning. 
Augustine certainly offers to us resources that remain important for any Christian 
attempting to think the divine, but he does so not only by offering a set of conceptual 
structures that we may use to show our own superior rationality, but by insisting that we 
face essential questions about our approach toward knowing and thinking when 
redemption is our need.  In an Augustinian light the one who attempts to think the divine 
makes progress only insofar as she or he is bound to the pain, loss, and yet God given 
desire of the contrite heart’s sacrifice. 
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